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Foreword
G. Robert Blakey*
Such then is the nature of a general law, that while the imperative part of it...
shall not take up above two or three words, its expository appendage, without
which that imperative part could not rightly perform its office, may occupy a con-
siderable volume.
Jee yBentham'
I. Introduction
October 15, 1990 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Organ-
ized Crime and Control Act, Title IX of which is known as the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or "RICO. ' 2 In the year
before the passage of RICO, Mario Puzo published his landmark bestsel-
ler, The Godfather. The book powerfully described the Mafia in a way that
fascinated the American people. In it, Michael Corleone, son of the orig-
inal godfather, Vito Corleone, described how the family's activities had
to evolve to succeed in the society of the twentieth century:
My father's time is done. The things he did can no longer be done
except with a great deal of risk. Whether we like it or not the Corleone
Family has to join that society. But when they do I'd like us to join it
with plenty of our own power; that is, money and ownership of other
valuables.
Michael Corleone realized that his family had to evolve in order to main-
tain its vitality as a profit-making enterprise. It had to take its assets and
use them to gain control of other businesses.4 This transformation
threatened to place the mob families beyond the reach of traditional
criminal law. RICO was one of the ways the law evolved to meet the
* WilliamJ. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., 1957,J.D.,
1960, University of Notre Dame. Faculty Advisor to the Notre Dame Law Review for this Sympo-
sium, Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO, 65 NoT DAME L. REV. 873 (1990).
My thanks to Matthew Fricker for his tireless assistance during the preparation of earlier drafts
of this Foreword.
1 J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. XVII, con-
duding note, 20, at 330 (special ed. 1986) (1st ed. 1789).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), codfied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
3 M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER 366 (1969). See also Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of
RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851,982-87 & nn. 435-43 (1990) (an analysis of the popular literature and
movies relating to organzied crime and RICO) [hereinafter RICO Myths].
4 The Corleone family, like some actual mob families, chose casinos in Las Vegas. Id. at 384-
85. See generally SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 71-74 (undated) (Didier, New York, pub-
lisher) ("As a case history of legalized gambling, Nevada speaks eloquently in the negative"); S.
BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS (Pocket ed. 1979) (relating career of Allen Dorfman); W. TURNER, GAMBLER'S
MONEY: THE NEW FORCE IN AMERICAN LUFE (1965); E. REID & 0. DEMARIS, THE GREEN FELTJUNGLE
(Pocket ed. 1964).
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challenge of organized crime and its evolution in the latter half of the
twentieth century.
The past twenty years witnessed a sea change in the way that organ-
ized crime is investigated, prosecuted, and sanctioned, both criminally
and civilly. RICO allowed the law to catch up with the rest of society. In
the twentieth century, organizations, not people, control the important
elements of society such as: government, commerce and labor. Until
the passage of RICO, organizations as such were seldom the focus of the
law-outside of, perhaps, the antitrust statutes. This is no longer true.
RICO, however, is not limited to the activities of traditional Mafia
families. It does not matter to a racketeering victim what type of organi-
zation steals his money, a crime family or a family bank. Accordingly,
Congress passed a statute in 1970 that encompassed the activities of both
legitimate and illegitimate organizations.
RICO also provided for innovative criminal and civil sanctions. For-
feiture, injunctions, triple damages, and counsels' fees all work to en-
hance the sanction of the wrongdoer and recovery for the wronged.
This Symposium 5 provided an opportunity to look ahead at some of
the key issues we must face in life with RICO as it enters its third decade.
Before taking that look, this Foreword will provide a brief background on
the development and the concepts of RICO.
II. Background of RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, Title
IX of which is known as RICO. 6 Congress enacted the 1970 Act "to
strengthen[] the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, [to] estab-
lish[] new penal prohibitions, and [to] provid[e][] enhanced sanctions
and new remedies .... ."7 RICO covers violence, the provision of illegal
goods and services, corruption in labor or management relations, cor-
ruption in government, and criminal fraud." Congress found that "the
sanctions and remedies available" under the law as it existed in 1970
were "unnecessarily limited in scope and impact."9 Congress then pro-
vided a wide range of new criminal and civil sanctions to control these
offenses, including imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions, and treble
damage relief for "person[s] injured" in their "business or property" by
violations of the statute. '0 At the time, these sanctions were called for by
5 The Symposium was held February 8-10, 1990, at the Notre Dame Law School, and was cos-
ponsored by the Notre Dame Law School and the Notre Dame Law Review.
6 For fuller discussions of the origins and underlying concepts of RICO, see generally Blakey &
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Reme-
dies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1009 (1980); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflection on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982) [hereinafter Civil Action]; Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief
Under Civil RICO, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526 (1987) [hereinafter Equitable Relief]. See also ORGAN-
IZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SEC., CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (3rd rev. ed. Sept. 1990).
7 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
8 Civil Action, supra note 6, at 300-06.
9 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 19 6 4(c) (1988).
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no less than the President," the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice,' 2 and the American Bar
Association.' 8
The"near-universal approval of the Act was evidenced by the over-
whelming majorities in both houses that voted for RICO. The Senate
passed the bill seventy-three to one.14 The House passed an amended
bill 431 to twenty-six.' 5 The Senate then passed the House bill after de-
bate, but without objection,' 6 and President Richard M. Nixon signed the
legislation on Oct. 15, 1970.17
The innovative approach to crime control embodied in the RICO
bill is reflected in legislation adopted by a majority of state legislatures.
Since 1970, twenty-nine states have enacted similar state RICO
legislation.' 8
A. Standards of Unlawful Conduct: Criminal and Civil
1. Standards
RICO sets forth "standards" of "unlawful" conduct, which are en-
forced through "criminal" and "civil" sanctions. Section 1963 of Title
18 sets out the criminal remedies. Section 1964 of Title 18 sets out the
civil remedies. Section 1962 explicitly states what is "unlawful," as op-
posed to what is criminal. As such, RICO is not, as some believe, "pri-
marily a criminal statute."' 9 Accordingly, because the civil scope of
RICO is broader than its criminal scope, RICO is not primarily criminal
and punitive, but primarily preventive and remedial. 20 RICO's civil rem-
edies, based on a showing of the preponderance of the evidence, are
available to the government or other parties. 2'
11 "Message on Organized Crime," reprinted in Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 449 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
12 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SociETr 208 (1967).
13 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 259; Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 Before the Sub-
comm. No. 5, House Committee on theJudiciary, 91st Cong, 2nd Sess. 537 (1970).
14 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
15 Id. at 35,363.
16 Id at 36,296.
17 Id at 37,264.
18 The first state to pass its own "little RICO" statute was Hawaii in May, 1972. The most recent
was Minnesota in August, 1989. See RICO Myths, supra note 3, at 988-1011 (1990) (chart in appendix
analyzing the law of the various states).
19 In Re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F.Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Va. 1983). See 115 CONG.
REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("The criminal provisions are intended primarily as an
adjunct to the civil provisions, which I consider as the more important feature of the bill."); 116
CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("the principal value of this legislation may well
be found to exist in its civil provisions").
20 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,497-98 (1985) ("read broadly... to effectuate its
remedial purpose"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (RICO is "both preventive
and remedial").
21 United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975) (government suit); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 530-32 (9th Cir.
1987) (private suit); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 ("[N]o indication ... depart from [preponderance]").
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2. Liberal Construction
Congress also directed that RICO "be liberally construed to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes." 22 This clause sets RICO apart from the bulk
of federal criminal law. As the Supreme Court noted, "[T]his is the only
substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive ... 23
The directive is a "mandate. ' 24 Accordingly, courts are required by the
statute to read the language of the statute in the same fashion, whatever
the character of the suit.25
3. No Supersession
While broad, RICO does not displace other bodies of law, federal or
state. RICO was, of course, an innovation:, "Congress was well aware
that it was [with RICO] entering into a new domain. ... 26 The issue
was not whether the 1970 Act should apply to the conduct prohibited by
its predicate offenses, but whether it should preempt other laws. Con-
gress expressly saved "provision[s] of Federal, State, or other law impos-
ing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those
provided for" in RICO.27 The Seventh Circuit succinctly captured
RICO's aim when it held that "Congress enacted RICO in order to sup-
plement, not supplant, the available remedies, since it thought those reme-
dies offered too little protection for the victims." ' 28 The Supreme Court
itself acknowledges that such overlap between statutes "is neither unu-
sual nor unfortunate." 29 The existence of cumulative remedies furthers
remedial purposes.30
22 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
23 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983). The liberal construction clause is not
unique in state law. It had its origins in the codification movement of the 19th century. Judicial
hostility to change through legislation was common at that time.
[W]here [judges] were not ready boldly to declare [it] unconstitutional, [they were
ready] to interpret it so restrictively as to narrow its effect.
These factors found expression in the abstract canons of statutory interpretations...
strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law; strict construction of penal
statutes, or of legislation that imposed "drastic" burdens, or of legislation that imposed
special damages ....
The effect was to put a primarily obstructive, if not destructive connotation on the
process of statutory interpretation.
W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw 186 (1950).
Legislatures reacted. "[Ilt became standard practice in drafting statutes to insert a preamble
stating broadly the purpose of the act and to'close with a provision declaring that the statute should
be liberally construed." D. WIGDOR, RoscoE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 174 (1974). In fact, a
majority of states has abolished the common law rule. The statutes are collected in CivilAction, supra
note 6, at 245 n.25. Strict construction is not a rule of constitutional dimension. Tarrant v. Ponte,
751 F.2d 459, 466 (1st Cir. 1985).
24 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988) (quot-
ing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10).
25 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; cf Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The words cannot be read one way in a suit which is to end in fine and
imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction.").
26 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
27 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
28 Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 6060 (1985) (emphasis added).
29 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969).
30 Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
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4. Elements of Section 1962 Violations
Section 1962(a). The standards of section 1962(a) embody four es-
sential elements: (1) income derived from a "pattern" of racketeering
(2) the use or investment of the income in the acquisition, establishment,
or operation by a defendant (3) of an "enterprise" (4) engaged or affect-
ing interstate commerce.3 '
Section 1962(b). The standards of section 1962(b) embody three es-
sential elements: (1) the acquisition or maintenance through a "pattern"
of racketeering activity by a defendant (2) of an interest in or control of
an "enterprise" (3) engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.3 2
Section 1962(c). The standards of section 1962(c) embody four es-
sential elements: (1) employment by or association of a defendant with
(2) an "enterprise" (3) engaged in or affecting interstate commerce (4)
the affairs of which are conducted by or participated in by a defendant
through a "pattern" of racketeering activity.3 3
Section 1962(d). The standards of section 1962(d) embody the con-
spiracy dimension of RICO. Section 1962(d) makes it "unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate [subsections (a), (b) or (c)]." ' 4
B. The Criminal Enforcement Mechanism
The criminal enforcement mechanism of RICO provides for impris-
onment, fines and criminal forfeiture. RICO authorizes imprisonment of
up to twenty years, or life, where the predicate offense authorizes life.3 5
In conjunction with other sections of United States Code Title 18, RICO
authorizes fines for RICO violations of up to $250,000 if an individual is
convicted,36 or up to $500,000 if an entity is convicted,37 or, alterna-
tively, twice the gain or loss. 3 8 Further, sentencing courts can order de-
fendants to pay restitution to victims of an offense.3 9 RICO itself
31 Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (9th Cir.
1986).
The Supreme Court provided its authoritative analysis of "pattern" in HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989). See RICO Myths, supra note 3, at 961-68 (analyzing the six-step
process of H.J. Inc. and due process vagueness issue). The best two pre-H.J., Inc. analyses of "pat-
tern" appear in Goldsmith, RICO and Pattern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971 (1988) and Note, Reconsidera-
tion of Pattern in Civil RICO Offense, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 83 (1986).
The best single analysis of "enterprise" is Note, Functions of RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 646 (1989).
32 Medallion Television Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1362
(9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
33 Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sedima, 473
U.S. at 496 ("A violation of § 1962(c) ... requires (1) conduct. (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity.")).
34 See generally United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845
(1984); United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1132-33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984);
Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1001 (1983).
35 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
36 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988) provides that violators "shall be fined under this title." Section
3571(b) of Title 18 provides for fines that an individual may be sentenced to pay.
37 Id. at § 3571(c).
38 Id. at § 3571(d).
39 See id. at §§ 3556, 3663-64.
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mandates that forfeiture can be of illicit proceeds, related property, or
any interest in an enterprise. 40
C. The Civil Enforcement Mechanism
The civil enforcement mechanism of RICO provides for injunctions,
treble damages, and counsel fees. The civil enforcement provisions were
modeled on, but are not identical to, the antitrust laws. 41 The antitrust
laws have been aptly termed "the Magna Charta of free enterprise."1
42
The antitrust laws "are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."' 43 A private "treble-
damages remedy [is needed] ... precisely for the purpose of encourag-
ing private challenges to antitrust violations."144 Such "private antitrust
litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws."' 45 Private suits "provide a significant supplement to the
limited resources available to the Department of Justice" to enforce the
antitrust statutes.46
Like the antitrust laws, RICO creates "a private enforcement mecha-
nism that . . . deter[s] violators and provide[s] ample compensation to
the victims." 4 7  In fact, RICO and the antitrust statutes are well
integrated.48
40 Id. at § 1963.
41 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-
60 (1970).
42 United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
43 Id.
44 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (emphasis in original).
45 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
46 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344. In fact, between 1960 and 1980, of the 22,585 civil and criminal cases
brought under the antitrust provision by the government or private parties, 84% were instituted by
private plaintiffs. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 431 (1981). Professor (now Judge) Posner also argues on economic
grounds forcefully for private enforcement of more than actual damages awards against all forms of
deliberate antisocial conduct, particularly where the factor of concealment is present. R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 462 (private enforcement), 143, 272 (more than actual damage awards
for deliberate conduct) 235 (concealment) (2d ed. 1977). See generally Equitable Relief, supra note 6, at
531 n.17 (history and rationale of treble damages).
47 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). See also Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) ("private attorneys general (for] a serious
national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate"); Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) ("vigorous incentives for plaintiffs to
pursue RICO claims"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 ("private attorney provision . . . designed to fill
prosecutive gaps" (citing Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344)).
48 "There are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to: violence (or threat of it),
deception, or market power." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1959). RICO focuses
on the first two; antitrust focuses on the third. See also American C & L Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Restraint may be exercised through force or fraud or
agreement."). See generally Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 No-
TE DAME L. REV. 526, 533-34 (1986) ("(1) encourage private citizens to bring RICO actions, (2)
deter future violators, and (3) compensate victims for all accumulative harm. These multiple and
convergent purposes make the treble damage provision a powerful mechanism in the effort to vindi-
cate the interests of those victimized by crime.").
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D. Organized Crime and Beyond
The scope of RICO began, but did not end, with an effort to sanc-
tion the Corleones' traditional, illegitimate activities. The "legislative
history [of RICO] clearly demonstrates that... [it] was intended to pro-
vide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized
crime and its economic roots."4 9 The Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Turkette that although "[t]he major purpose of Title IX... [was]
to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime," the
statute is not limited because "Congress wanted to reach both 'legiti-
mate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises." 50 As the Court observed last year:
[The notion that RICO is limited to organized crime] finds no support
in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative his-
tory.... Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general
statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was
not limited in application to organized crime.5 1
The legislative history of the 1970 statute is replete with statements
by the bill's sponsors that fully demonstrate that they intended that it
apply beyond organized crime. Representative Robert McCory, a floor
manager of RICO, stated this intention:
[E]very effort... [was] made [in drafting RICO] to produce a strong
and effective tool with which to combat organized crime-and at the
same time deal fairly with all who might be affected by... [the] legisla-
tion-whether part of the crime syndicate or not.5 2
The Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. observed that legiti-
mate businesses, in short, "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for crimi-
nal activity nor immunity from its consequences."5 3 As such, RICO fits
easily into a consistent pattern of federal legislation enacted as general
reform over the past half century, aimed at a specific target, but drafted
without limiting it to the specific target.5 4
49 Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
50 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591, 590. The Fourth Circuit similarly commented: "[R]ejected [also has
been the] notion [that RICO] applies only to organized crime in the 'classic mobster' sense." United
States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
51 HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2903, 2905 (1989). See also Sedima, 473
U.S. at 495 ("not just mobsters"); Owl Construction Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d
540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984) ("[C]ourts and ... commentators have
persuasively and exhaustively explained why... RICO ... [is not limited to] organized crime .... ").
52 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Robert McCory, a House floor manager of
RICO).
53 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985). Finally, "the courts [are also] all but unanimous in their refusal to
read RICO as prohibiting only the infiltration of legitimate business." United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (emphasis in original).
54 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (extortion), held not limited to racketeering in United States
v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988) (Travel Act), held not limited to
organized crime bribery in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 46 (1979); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1988)
(lottery tickets), held not limited to organized crime in United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-
67 (1966); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1988) (bank robbery), held not limited to gangsters in Bell v. United
States, 462 U.S. 356, 358-62 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988) (white slave traffic), held not limited to
commercial prostitution in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-90 (1917). See generally,
Equitable Relief, supra note 6, at 529 n.13 (other cases collected).
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E. Implementation of Public Criminal and Civil RICO
At first, the Department of Justice moved slowly to use RICO in
criminal prosecutions. Today, it is the prosecutor's tool of choice against
sophisticated forms of crime.55 The Department of Justice has also be-
gun to implement the civil provisions. 56 Since 1970, criminal RICO has
been effectively used against:
1. organized crime groups;57
2. political corruption; 58
3. white-collar crime;59 and
4. violent groups. 60
Independent studies conclude that RICO is effective against sophis-
ticated forms of crime. The President's Commission on Organized
Crime had high praise for RICO and recommended that states adopt
similar legislation. 61 The General Accounting Office, too, in its study of
Federal organized crime prosecutions concluded:
Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized criminal group
was an awkward affair. RICO facilitates the prosecution of a criminal
group involved in superficially unrelated criminal ventures and enter-
prises connected only at the usually well-insulated upper levels of the
organization's bureaucracy .....
Before the Act, the government's efforts were necessarily piece-
meal, attacking isolated segments of the organization as they engaged
in single criminal acts. The leaders, when caught, were only penalized
for what seemed to be unimportant crimes. The larger meaning of
these crimes was lost because the big picture could not be presented in
a single criminal prosecution. With the passage of RICO, the entire
picture of the organization's criminal behavior and the involvement of
55 See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on theJudiciaty, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 109-11 (1985) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott) [hereinafter
Trott Testimony].
56 Id at 116-17. (litigation against mob-controlled unions reviewed).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) (RICO prosecution of
"members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering
activities, including murder, extortion, gambling and loan sharking"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 541 (2nd Cir. 1988) (conviction of public
officials in N.Y.C. parking scandal); United States v. Mandel, 431 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977), rev'd,
591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.) aff'dpercuriam by equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979)(en banc)
(conviction of governor of Maryland for RICO mail fraud and bribery), cert denied, 445 U.S. 461
(1986), conviction vacated, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (in light of United States v. McNally, 107 S.
Ct. 2875 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988) (McNally result set aside), passed at, 134 CONG. REC.
HI 1207 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (prosecution
of Japanese corporation for RICO mail fraud and bribery).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28, 1540, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988)
(prosecution of "Order" or "Bruders Schweigh," white-hate group for robbery and murder of Alan
Berg), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 171 (1989). See generally, S. SINGULAR, TALKED TO DEATH: THE MURDER
OF ALAN BERG AND THE RISE OF THE NEO-NAZIS (1989).
61 THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME
(April 1986) concludes that RICO is one of the most powerful and effective weapons in existence for
fighting organized crime. Id. at 133-34.
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its leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and
presented. 62
F. Implementation of Private Civil RICO
The private bar'did not begin to bring civil RICO suits until about
1975. When it did, the district courts reacted with hostility and under-
took judicially to redraft the statute in an effort to dismiss civil suits in all
possible ways.63 Indeed, before Sedima, sixty-one percent of the reported
decisions were dismissed on various motions of the defendants. 64
The first effort to redraft civil RICO involved reading an "organized
crime" limitation into it. Because that limitation had no support in the
text of the statute-it was specifically rejected in the legislative debates-
the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits quickly rejected it.65 The
next effort involved reading a "competitive injury" limitation into the
statute. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits quickly turned this effort
aside.66 Then, the district courts hit upon the "racketeering injury" and
the "criminal conviction" limitations. Both limitations, although
adopted by a sharply divided Second Circuit, were repudiated by the
Supreme Court in Sedima.67
62 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATrACK ON LA COSA
NOSTRA, (April 14, 1988). The Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations recently con-
cluded that federal law enforcement agencies "should continue, in appropriate and deserving cases,
their innovative and effective use of the enterprise theory of investigation, the task force approach,
and the provisions of the RICO statute." PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL GOVERMENT'S USE OF THE RICO STATUTE AND OTHER
EFFORTS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME, S. REP. No. 407, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1990). The New
York Times, in a recent special report, "The Mob in Decline," discussed RICO's utility in the fight
against organized crime:
Law-enforcement officials generally credit a long-term strategy adopted by the Justice De-
partment and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early 1980's: developing cases
against the top leaders of organized-crime families and relying largely on the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, as a courtroom tool.
By concentrating on enterprises rather than individuals, Federal prosecutors in the last
five years have removed the high commands of families through the convictions and long
prison sentences of almost 100 top Cosa Nostra leaders.
Raab, A Battered and Ailing Mafia Is Losing Its Grip on America, N.Y. Times, Oct 22, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
See also, Organized Crime: 25 Years after Valachi: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988) (testimony of David C.
Williams, Director of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office); McFadden, The Mafia of
1980s: Divided and Under Siege, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Busting the Mob, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 3, 1986 at 24; The Mob on Trial, Newsday, Sept. 7, 1986 at 4, col. 1.
63 See Hom,Jdicial Plague Sweeps United States "Result Orientitis"Infects Civil RICO Decisions, 5 Nat'l.
LJ., May 23, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
64 Trott Testimony, supra note 55, at 127.
65 Alcorn County Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1984) (cases
cited).
66 Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (the
organized crime limitation "revived under... [a new] guise"); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1058-59 (9th Cir.), aft' on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983).
67 The Second Circuit suggested in Sedima that civil RICO suits against "respected and legiti-
mate enterprises" were "extraordinary, if not outrageous." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741
F.2d 482,487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Included among the cited legitimate enter-
prises was E.F. Hutton. But see BusINEss WEEK, Feb. 24, 1986, at 98, col. I (Hutton pleads guilty to
2000 counts of mail fraud multiple-million dollar bank scam); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 395 n.14 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) ("[T]he white collar
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III. The Continuing Enterprise of RICO: Issues
RICO provides fertile ground for legal scholarship-perhaps too
fertile.68 Nevertheless, given its innovative approach-mandating new
procedures and new sanctions-RICO continues to merit meaningful
criticism. This is particularly true when the analysis comes from sources
other than the round up of the usual suspects, i.e., law school professors
or students. Instead, the participants in this Symposium were largely
practitioners drawn from both sides of the RICO bar, who possess a
wealth of RICO litigation experience. The Symposium also benefitted
from contributions by respected members of the media and academia.
The papers of the symposium address several RICO issues that are
presently the foci of heated debate in legislatures and law schools around
the country. Two papers address the proper role of civil RICO. Geof-
frey Aronow, in a piece replete with culinary analogies, 69 sketches the
legislative background of recent civil RICO reform proposals. He then
explains the evolving rationales for civil RICO, finds them inadequate,
and argues that major reform is necessary. Arthur Mathews, focusing
specifically on civil RICO in the securities context, initially outlines the
elements of traditional securities claims for relief, and contends that the
securities laws adequately address securities violations. He then explains
the advantages that plaintiffs gain by using RICO in securities cases, ad-
vantages that have resulted in the overuse of RICO in the securities con-
text. He concludes that Congress should delete the private civil cause of
action based on commercial fraud.
Section 1963 forfeiture, one of the RICO's most controversial provi-
sions, is the subject of two papers. William Taylor addresses forfeiture
from the perspective of the defendant, and argues that RICO forfeitures
are disproportionate when they reach property not connected to criminal
activity. He proposes that forfeiture be limited to property obtained by,
or directly used in, the criminal conduct. Graeme Bush addresses forfei-
ture from the perspective of the third party, faced with the possible loss
of property accepted in return for legitimate goods or services. He notes
that third parties face the unenviable task of estimating their own possi-
ble exposure to a forfeiture order, and urges that a tracing requirement
be adopted.
crime alleged in some RICO complaints against 'legitimate' businesses is in some ways at least as
disturbing .... "). Those who make such remarks are apparently unaware of the substantial body of
literature on white-collar crime by so-called respected businesses. See, e.g., Ross, How Lawless Are Big
Companies, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 57 (the 1043 major corporate violations between 1970-1980
included: 117 convictions or consent decrees for 98 antitrust violations; 18 kickbacks, briberies or
illegal rebates; 21 illegal political contributions; 11 frauds; and five tax evasions).
68 "So much analysis exists in praise of condemnation of RICO that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to provide new insight into the subject." Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal
RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAE L. REv. 1035, 1035 (1990).
69 Aronow, In Defense of Sausage Reform: Legislative Changes to Civil RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
964 (1990). Mr. Aronow describes "the 'sausage-like' qualities of the current [reform] proposal"
and then illuminates the reader by "unpeel[ing] this onion and see[ing] if there is anything there that
justifies the preservation of civil RICO .... " Id. at 969, 975. He concludes that the existing civil
RICO "is incapable of separating the wheat from the chaff" and that although the present reform
proposals may not be exactly delicious, "the fact that the sausage may not be a filet mignon is not a
reason to send it back to the kitchen .... Id. at 980, 982.'
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A third group of papers focuses on the actual targets of RICO suits.
Paul Coffey provides a glimpse into the inner workings of the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section, the Department of Justice office that
authorizes federal RICO prosecutions. His piece explains the three
stages-selection, analysis, and finally approval-through which all fed-
eral RICO prosecutions pass before the indictments are filed. While Mr.
Coffey focuses on how defendants are chosenJay Wright focuses on who
should worry about becoming RICO defendants-specifically, profes-
sionals. Mr. Wright initially relates how traditional limitations on profes-
sional liability were eroding even before RICO, and then explains that
RICO gives plaintiffs even greater incentive to reach the deep pockets of
professionals. Gordon Crovitz presents a view of RICO from Wall
Street, and in a stinging critique of RICO, focuses on why certain groups
should not face RICO prosecutions. He argues that RICO when drafted
was not meant to apply to legitimate businesses, that DOJ prosecuting
guidelines re-emphasized this principle, but that in the 1980s prosecu-
tors ignored these restrictions and proceeded to unfairly attack entities
-like Princeton/Newport Partners Ltd. and Drexel Burnham Lambert.
One last paper, by Bruce Baird and Carolyn Vinson, discusses how
RICO pretrial restraints operate, using the recent case involving
Princeton/Newport Partners Ltd. as a starting point. They conclude that
due process requires a pre-seizure hearing.
In addition the articles presented live at the symposium, this issue
includes a student note addressing what is perhaps the last serious con-
stitutional challenge to RICO, that the statute's use of "pattern" makes
RICO void-for-vagueness. Several of the articles in this issue refer to this
potentially lawbusting challenge. 70 The Note pays special attention to
circuit court precedent and RICO's legislative history, and concludes
that "pattern" is sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster.
IV. Conclusion
This Symposium did not consist solely of papers delivered, in short
form, to a passive audience. This was a live symposium in the true sense
of the word, where the presentation of the papers always provoked dis-
cussion and often sparked sharp disagreement. The value of such ex-
changes is reflected in the difference between the papers as delivered and
the papers as printed.
Unfortunately, not all of the conversations and discussions produced
by this symposium can be presented. Nevertheless, the proceedings of
the last day of the symposium were recorded and are included. The de-
bate and discussion featured symposium authors Paul Coffey and
Gordon Crovitz, symposium moderator John Coffee, and this author.7 1
70 See id at 969; Coffey, supra note 68, at 1035, 1037 & nn. 2 & 17; Crovitz, How the RICO Monster
Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050, 1066-67 (1990); and Mathews, Shifting the Burden of
Losses in Securities Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 896,
929-31 nn. 175-83 (1990).
71 This author also delivered a draft of a paper titled "RICO and Time Bars." This piece was
originally scheduled to appear in this issue but was delayed so that work could be done for Congress
during the processing of H.R. 5111, "The RICO Amendments Act of 1990," which was reported to
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The transcript includes some very powerful passages, passages that,
while perhaps not as polished as the usual published pieces, seem to cap-
ture more effectively the emotions that RICO evokes from opponents
and proponents alike..
On a personal note, I would like to thank the principal speakers and
the two moderators. 72 All the participants brought years of experience
working with RICO, and their insights created a sense of excitement dur-
ing the symposium. It is this author's belief that RICO changed the
course of criminal and civil law over the last twenty years. It was a plea-
sure hosting the attorneys who will play major roles in the course of
RICO over the next twenty years.
the House by theJudiciary Committee on September 18, 1990. See 6 Civil RICO Report (BNA), No.
16, at 1 (Sept. 25, 1990).
72 Special thanks to Norman Abrams, Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles
School of Law, and to John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University
School of Law. Professor Abrams moderated the first six sessions of this symposium. Professor
Coffee moderated the last five sessions and appears in the Debate and Discussion.
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